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Abstract
We analyse a competitive commodity market with a large number of buyers
and sellers where: a. Individual qualities, either high or low, are not observable
by buyers; b. Sellers strategically announce prices and buyers decide whether
to buy having observed sellers’ actions. We find that the set of robust equilib-
ria includes only fully separating equilibria. In any robust equilibrium the low
quality is always traded. The high quality is traded if demand is sufficiently
strong, so that low quality sellers are unable to satisfy all buyers, and is never
traded otherwise. Hence, few rotten apples is better than a plentiful of lemons
for plums’ sellers.
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1 Introduction
We study a competitive market where sellers strategically take their pricing decisions
and buyers, who are uninformed about the quality of the commodity in the hands of
individual sellers, act after observing sellers’ actions. Akerlof (1970) showed that in
a market where buyers are less informed than sellers, the presence of lemons might
drive the best qualities out of the market. The ultimate objective of our analysis is
to understand how this (possibly adverse) selection mechanism operates when sellers’
pricing decisions might convey information relevant to the buyers.
We consider a commodity market with a large number of sellers and buyers. Sellers
fall into two categories depending on whether the quality they are endowed with is
high or low. Buyers know the proportions of low and high qualities in the market but
cannot observe individual qualities. Sellers are informed about their own quality and
have the same information as the buyers regarding other sellers. Sellers move first and
simultaneously decide which price(s) to announce, if any. Buyers decide whether to
buy and if so at which price(s), after having observed the actions of the individual
sellers. Hence, the sequence of events is that of a signaling game where the actions of
the informed might convey relevant information to the uninformed. At the same time,
the market is competitive to the extent that there is a large number of buyers, who
are price takers, and a large number of sellers, who engage in price competition.
When buyers’ off-equilibrium beliefs are restricted on the basis of the D1 dominance
criterion (see Cho and Kreps 1987), the resulting set of robust equilibria only includes
fully separating equilibria, where sellers of different types undertake different actions,
thereby fully revealing their type. In any of these equilibria, the low quality is always
traded. Whether the high quality is traded or not depends, other things equal, upon
market conditions. More precisely, if the supply of low quality is enough to satisfy all
buyers, only the low quality is traded. Viceversa, if market conditions are reversed,
both the high quality and the low quality are traded. Plums are easier to market if the
Akerlof’s selection mechanism is induced by the presence of few rotten apples rather
than a plentiful of lemons.
The intuition behind this novel result goes as follows. In any equilibrium where
only low quality is traded, if the supply of low quality is not enough to satisfy all
buyers, low quality sellers sell their commodity with probability one at a price equal
to buyers’ reservation price, thereby making strictly positive profits. Differently, the
high quality sellers, who are not willing to sell at the market price, make zero profits.
Hence, only the low quality sellers face an opportunity cost of deviating from their
equilibrium strategy. Because of that, a low quality seller would find it profitable to
deviate by announcing a higher price, p, if and only if the probability to sell at p is high
enough. High quality sellers, instead, profit from such a deviation so long as there is a
positive probability to sell. This probability could always be so so low that only high
quality sellers could possibly benefit from deviating. But then, buyers would regard
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such a deviation as a signal of high quality. We show that there always deviations, p,
such that a buyer prefers to buy at p, given the refined beliefs associated with p. This
creates incentives for any high quality seller to deviate, which destroys the equilibrium.
The above reasoning does not hold when market conditions are reversed so that the
supply of low quality is enough to satisfy all customers. Under these circumstances,
in any equilibrium where only the low quality is traded, the competitive pressure
ensures that the price equals sellers’ reservation utility, so that low quality sellers make
zero profits as well as the high quality sellers who are not selling their commodities.
Therefore, neither type of seller faces any opportunity cost of deviating. Hence, off-
equilibrium prices do not provide any meaningful signal, and the equilibrium where
only the low quality is traded is robust.
When the supply of low quality is not sufficient to satisfy the demand, a robust
separating equilibrium where both qualities are traded arises, and only then. In this
equilibrium the high quality trades at a higher price than the low quality. Sellers are
on the long side of the market at the higher price and are never on the long side at
the lower price. Hence, sellers charging the lower price are surely able to sell their
commodity, while the probability to make a sale at the higher price is less than one.
This explains why a fully separating equilibrium where both qualities are traded is
sustainable: the comparatively low chances to sell at the higher price dissuade low
quality sellers from announcing it. Since all buyers are sure to get a commodity, and
one of high quality, if buying at the higher price, the only viable deviation would be to
announce a price (slightly) lower than that price. However, so long as the probability
to sell at the higher equilibrium price is such that low quality sellers are indifferent
between charging either the low or the high equilibrium price, both types of sellers
face the same incentives to deviate. Therefore, deviations do not have any signaling
content. This explains why an equilibrium where both qualities are traded is robust.
The same logics also explains why the amount of high quality being traded is less
than the total supply of high quality. Incentive compatibility for low quality sellers
dictates that the probability to make a sale at the high price should stay lower than
one. This implies that, even if demand exceeds total supply, there will always be sellers
(of high quality) unable to sell their commodity. This, even when they strictly prefer to
do so. Prices should fall to equate demand and supply, but they fail to do so because of
the imperfect information. High quality sellers are therefore rationed, in a sense similar
to the concept of rationing put forward by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Moreover, the
more buyers value quality, the higher is the price at which the high quality is traded.
The higher the price of high quality, the lower must be the probability to sell at that
price, which means that less of the high quality is traded. The model thus displays a
sort of high quality’s curse.
The paper relates to the classic literature on the market for lemons. In his research
upon the nature of equilibrium in market with adverse selection, Wilson (1980) con-
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siders, among various price setting conventions, a version of Akerlof’s model with price
setting sellers. He finds equilibria in which sellers of different qualities announce dif-
ferent prices. Different prices can be sustained in equilibrium as long as sellers are on
the long side of the market at the relatively higher prices. These equilibria, however,
do not exhaust the set of possible equilibria, which also includes single price (pooling)
equilibria and other hybrids. As Wilson explains, the reason why the equilibrium can
take so many forms, is
“the absence of restrictions on the expectations of agents outside the
set of [equilibrium] prices actually announced” [page 126].
He also comments:
“we would like the equilibrium to have the [robustness] property that
even if sellers occasionally experiment by announcing a new price, their
experience will never lead them to revise their expectations in such a way
that they permanently alter their equilibrium behaviour. [..] The problem
is that it is no longer obvious what it means to restrict expectations to be
‘correct’ at prices at which no trade takes place” [page 127].
Our setup, in which buyers observe individual sellers’ actions, provides solid grounds
for applying restrictions to the off-equilibrium beliefs based on various dominance
criteria, thereby reducing the typical indeterminacy to a great extent. This enables us
to fully characterise the set of (robust) equilibria. Laffont and Maskin (1986) study an
oligopolistic market where sellers can signal quality through their prices and conclude
that, even in the case of just two firms, the problem of characterising all perfect
Bayesian equilibria seems intractable.
The reduced indeterminacy makes it also possible a welfare comparison between
the market with price setting sellers and a centralized Walrasian market, where agents
are price-takers and trade occurs at a single price set by an auctioneer. We find
that the two models yield the same result only if the supply of low quality is enough
to satisfy the demand. Otherwise, the Walrasian model can either do better or worse
than the model with strategic price setting. This depends on how strong is the demand
compared to total supply and on whether the welfare gains from trading the low quality
exceed those from trading the high quality.
In a series of papers, Grossman and Stiglitz1 discuss how the informational role of
equilibrium prices alters the concepts of competitive equilibrium and efficient markets.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that the informational role of contractual
offers made by uninformed parties might compromise the existence of a competitive
equilibrium. Our analysis shows how the information conveyed by off equilibrium
1See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, 1976).
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prices announced by the informed can drastically reduce the number of plausible equi-
librium outcomes.
Janssen and Roy (2002) study the lemons problem in the context of a dynamic
model of a market for durable goods, where sellers are on the short side of the market.
Low quality sellers have a higher incentive to sell their goods in the short run than
high quality sellers, which generates a separating equilibrium where low qualities are
sold earlier than high qualities.
From a technical viewpoint, we show that the equilibria robust to D1 satisfy a
quasi-uniqueness property: all robust equilibria yield the same prediction in terms
of traded qualities and associated prices and quantities. This result is in line with
Cho and Sobel (1990). They show that, if a specific sorting condition is satisfied, D1
gives uniqueness and eliminates all types of equilibria that involve poolings of different
types, unless the pooling occurs at the upper bound of the action space. In our model,
the sorting condition is only satisfied for a subset of the action set.2 Still, the robust
equilibria are always fully separating and the equilibrium outcome is unique in terms
of traded quantities and qualities.
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we present the model’s structure.
Section three discusses the equilibrium concept. In sections four, five and six we
analyse the robustness of the various types of equilibria. Section seven explains the
relationship between market conditions and the quality and quantity of trade. Section
eight discusses the efficiency implications of the model. Section nine generalizes the
results to the case of any finite discrete number of qualities. A final section concludes
the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a competitive commodity market populated by a large number of buyers,
B, and a large number of sellers, S. The set S of sellers is indexed by s = 1, ...., S; s ∈
S. Each seller is endowed with one unit of commodity. Commodities come in two
different qualities, q = h, l. Each seller has a probability λ to be endowed with quality
h and probability 1−λ to be endowed with quality l. We refer to sellers endowed with
quality q as sellers of type-q. The law of large number applies, so that λ is interpreted
as the fraction of type-h sellers. The individual monetary utility that type-q sellers
derive from their commodity is v(q), with v(h) > v(l). v(q) represents the reservation
price for sellers of type q. Accordingly, a seller of type-q who sells at a price p receives
a net payoff p− v(q).
2We note that Laffont and Maskin (1987) study the signaling effect of pricing decision in a mo-
nopolistic market. They restrict the set of perfect bayesian equilibria to those which maximize the
monopolist’s profits. In some cases, these could be pooling equilibria. However, these need not be
robust to D1 as Cho and Sobel (1990) observe.
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The set B of buyers is indexed by b = 1, ..., B; b ∈ B. Each buyer consumes either
one unit of commodity or nothing. Buyers share identical preferences defined by the
monetary utility function u(q), where u(h) > u(l). We impose u(q) > v(q) for q = h, l,
which implies that under full information there are always gains from trade to be
realized. For expositional purposes, we also impose u(l) < v(h). In words, buyers are
never willing to buy a low quality commodity at any price that is feasible for a high
quality seller.3 The distribution of qualities is common knowledge. However, buyers
cannot observe individual qualities. Moreover, quality is not verifiable ex post.
The market functions as follows. Sellers act first. At stage 0, they simultaneously
decide which action to play, while buyers do nothing. Each individual seller s plays
an action a0s that is either announcing a price p ∈ R+, in which case a0s = p, or stay off
the market, which corresponds to not announcing any price and is denoted by a0s = n.
For each individual seller, s, we denote α0s : As → [0, 1] a probability distribution
over the set of possible actions As = R+ ∪ {n}, and with As the set of all probability
distributions over As. We define a0 ≡ {a01, ...., a0S}, with a0s ∈ As, as an action profile
for the sellers, where p ⊆ a0 is the set of prices associated with a0. Note that p = ø if
the action profile a0 is such that none of the sellers announces a price. We also define
α0 ≡ {α01, ..., α0S}, with α0s ∈ As, as a mixed action profile for the sellers.
At stage 1, given sellers’ actions resulting from stage zero, buyers simultaneously
decide at which price(s) to buy if any, while sellers do nothing. Buyers observe the
entire action profile of sellers, a0 as well as the action played by each single seller s,
a0s. Hence, when faced with an individual seller s, buyers’ information is given by a
0
s
and a0−s. Given a set of prices p, define a
1
b as the action for an individual buyer b.
Each buyer b can either choose to buy at some p ∈ p, in which case a1b = p, or not to
buy, in which case a1b = n and the buyer’s surplus equals zero. Accordingly, the set of
possible actions for any buyer b is Ab ≡ R+ ∪ {n}. Note that if no prices are posted,
buyers can only choose not to buy.4 We call a1 = {a11, ..., a1B} an action profile for the
buyers, where a1b ∈ Ab, ∀b ∈ B. We denote with α1 ≡ {α11, ..., α1B}, α1b : Ab → [0, 1], a
mixed action profile for the buyers.
Buyers and sellers match randomly. If at any price there is excess demand/supply,
the purchase/sale is randomly assigned. The probability to make a sale at any price
p is given by the minimum between one and the ratio of buyers to sellers willing to
trade at p. Symmetrically, the probability to make a purchase at p is the minimum
between one and the ratio of sellers to buyers willing to trade at that price.
3We give a brief account of what happens when u(l) ≥ v(h) in section 7.
4We assume that choosing to buy at a price that has not been announced (p /∈ p) is equivalent to
not buying. In other words, sellers are committed to sell at the prices they announced.
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3 Equilibrium analysis
A seller of type q selling at a price p makes non-negative profits if and only if p ≥ v(q).
Prior to observing sellers’ actions, buyers’ (ex ante) individual beliefs that an individual
seller s is of type h are given by the probability λ. By contrast, upon observing the
action a0s played by a seller s, and given the sellers’ action profile a
0, buyers’ (ex post)
beliefs that the seller s playing a0s is of type q are given by the conditional probability
function σ(q|a0s, a0−s). Given the belief function σ(., .), the expected utility of a buyer
who obtains the commodity at a price p, is
µ(p, a0, σ) ≡ u(h)σ(h|p, a0) + u(l)σ(l|p, a0), (1)
where σ(l|p, a0) = 1− σ(h|p, a0) is the probability associated with the buyers’ beliefs
that the seller s is of type l. Accordingly, µ(p, a0, σ) is the maximum willingness to
pay of each individual buyer.
Given a0, and a1, let us denote with J(p, a) the probability to make a sale when




s, a−s|q, σ) ≡
{
J(p, a)[p− v(q)] if a0s = p
0 if a0s = n.
(2)
Similarly, for any individual buyer b, let us denote with K(p, a) the probability to
buy when playing a1b = p. Again, K depends both on the action profile of buyers, a
1,







K(p, a)[µ(p, a0, σ)− p] if a1b = p
0 if a1b = n.
(3)
Let α ≡ {α0, α1} be a mixed action profile for sellers and buyers. Then, we denote
with J(p, α) the expected value of the probability to sell at a given p, evaluated by
taking the expectation of J(p, a) over the probability distribution associated with
α. Given the realization a0 of α0, we denote with K(p, α1, |a0) the expected value
of the probability to buy at p, evaluated by taking the expectation of K(p, a), over
the probability distribution associated with α1. Consequently, when agents play mixed
strategies, we denote with pis(α
0
s, α−s|q, σ) and pib(α1b , α1−b|a0, σ) the sellers’ and buyers’
expected payoffs, respectively. Then,
Definition 1. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a profile of actions α∗ =
{α0∗, α1∗} - where the realisation a0∗ of α0∗ contains the set of market prices p∗ - and
a belief function σ∗(q|a0s, a0−s) common to all buyers, with
∑
q=h,l σ
∗(q|a0s, a0−s) = 1,
such that:











−b|a0∗, σ∗) ≥pib(α1b , α1∗−b|a0∗, σ∗), ∀b ∈ B, a0∗, α1b ∈ Ab ;
ii Buyers’ beliefs are derived from sellers’ strategies using Bayes rule where possible;
iii For all s, a0, aˆ0, and q = l, h, buyers’ beliefs satisfy σ∗(q|a0s, a0−s) = σ∗(q|aˆ0s, aˆ0−s)
if a0s = aˆ
0
s.
Conditions i)-ii) do not require any explanation. Condition iii) implies that beliefs
about seller s are independent from other sellers’ actions, even in the presence of
deviations (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 332). This condition is motivated by the
fact that sellers different from s have no information about s’s type, that is not also
available to the buyers.
The equilibrium also requires that agents correctly assess the probabilities to sell
and buy at the equilibrium prices. We shall also impose that, when choosing their
actions, agents correctly guess the probability to make a transaction at any other
price.5 If we were not to apply this condition, any form of price competition could
disappear under the appropriate choice of beliefs about the likelihood to make a sale
or a purchase at prices different from the equilibrium prices. This would result in a
large amount of equilibria with little economic interest.6
Various types of equilibria are, in principle, possible. In particular we could have:
a Separating equilibria, in which, by definition, different seller-types take different
actions. In turn, these equilibria divide into two types: Type I, where only low
quality sellers are on the market, while high quality sellers are out of the market
and Type II, where all types of sellers are on the market (they announce a price);
b Pooling equilibria, in which all qualities are traded at the same price;
c Partially separating (Hybrid) equilibria, in which poolings of the various qualities
that differ in their composition are traded at different prices.
While both in pooling and in hybrid equilibria all types of sellers are on the market
and announce a price, we can have fully separating equilibria where only low quality
sellers are on the market (type I separating equilibria).7 Equilibria in which the high
5The likelihood to sell at any off-equilibrium price clearly depends on buyers’ beliefs about the
quality of the seller who announces such a price. Since our analysis will refine off-equilibrium beliefs,
this probability will become identifiable.
6For instance, an unjustified fear of not being able to sell the good at a lower price would prevent
sellers from undercutting their competitors even in a perfect information framework.
7Note that whenever high quality sellers are on the market, low quality sellers must also be on
the market since at any price at which is profitable to sell high qualities is also profitable to sell low
qualities.
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quality is driven out of the market have received particular attention since Akerlof’s
seminal paper, given the dramatic market failure they might entail. We turn our
attention to the robustness of such separating equilibria first, and then we proceed
with the analysis of robustness for the various types of equilibria where all types of
sellers announce a price.
4 Type I separating equilibria: Only low quality
sellers are on the market
Definition 2. A type I fully separating equilibrium (FSE) is a PBE where high quality
sellers are off the market.
We note that staying off-market is an equilibrium strategy for high quality sellers
as long as the probability to sell at any price which guarantees them a non-negative
expected payoff is zero, given buyers’ equilibrium strategies.8 Define θ ≡ B/S, the
overall ratio of buyers to sellers, then
Lemma 1. There always exist FSE of type I. Any FSE of type I satisfies the fol-
lowing properties: i. It implies a single equilibrium price p∗ such that σ∗(h|p∗, a0∗) ≡
σ∗(h|p∗) = 0; ii. p∗ = u(l) if (1− λ) ≤ θ, and p∗ = v(l) otherwise.
Proof. See appendix.
When 1− λ > θ, sellers of low quality are the long side of the market. Therefore,
they compete to sell their commodity, which drives profits to zero (p∗ = v(l)). If, on
the other hand, they are the short side (1− λ ≤ θ), there is no competitive pressure.
Thus, sellers announce p∗ = u(l) which ensures strictly positive profits.
A natural question to ask is what kind of off-equilibrium beliefs support the exis-
tence of these FSE of type I. Off-equilibrium beliefs should be such that none of the
sellers has incentive to deviate from her equilibrium strategy and announce a price p
different from the equilibrium price. As explained in the proof of lemma 1, a possible
set of beliefs which support type I equilibria is that which assigns σ(h|p, a0∗) = 0 to
any seller announcing a price p 6= p∗.
The question we ask is how reasonable are the off-equilibrium beliefs which support
type I FSE. To answer this question we proceed by defining as reasonable those sets
of beliefs which satisfy some standard criteria to be identified. Then, we assess under
which conditions FSE of type I are robust, in the sense that they are supported by
reasonable off equilibrium beliefs.
8However, this is not the only equilibrium strategy for type h sellers. In fact, they could be in the
market posting some price ph ≥ v(h) at which trade does not occur. As we shall see when analysing
type II separating equilibria, this is actually, under some circumstances, a robust equilibrium.
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In the spirit of equilibrium refinements in signaling games, the procedure we adopt
to test the robustness of FSE of type I, which will be then applied also to FSE of
type II as well as pooling and hybrid equilibria, goes as follows. First, off-equilibrium
beliefs associated with some deviation are refined by individuating type-action pairs
that are “less likely” to occur. Second, the best response of the individual buyer, given
the deviation and the refined beliefs, is computed under the assumption that all other
buyers stick to their equilibrium strategies.9 Finally, given buyers’ best response,
we consider whether the deviation is profitable for the individual seller under the
assumption that no other seller is deviating.
4.1 Restrictions on off-equilibrium beliefs and robustness of
FSE of type I
In general, given buyers’ beliefs σ(q|p) associated with a deviation p (to be specified),
a seller of quality q will strictly benefit from deviating if:
pi∗s(q) < J(p, α)[p− v(q)], (4)
where pi∗s(q) is the seller’s equilibrium payoff. The seller would be indifferent if equality
holds or would strictly prefer not to deviate if the inequality is reversed.
Upon observing a deviation p, each buyer decides whether to buy at p, or at any
of the old equilibrium prices, p∗. Thus, each buyer compares the expected payoff at
p∗ with the expected payoff from buying at p. After the deviation, individual buyers’
payoff when buying at any p∗ ∈ p∗ is
pib(p
∗, α1∗−b, |a0, σ∗) = K(p∗, α1∗|a0){σ∗(h|p∗)[u(h)−p∗]+(1−σ∗(h|p∗))[u(l)−p∗]}. (5)
Before we proceed with the refinements of the off equilibrium beliefs, it is worth to
point out two potential problems in determining the value of (5). First, in principle,
K(p∗, α1∗|a0) may be different from any of its possible equilibrium values because (at
least) one seller has deviated and to p. Therefore, a0, which contains p, occurs with
probability zero in equilibrium. Also, some buyers may have deviated as well and in
this case α1 would be different from α1∗. Because of that, it is not straightforward
that the payoff from buying at p∗ should be the same as in in equilibrium, i.e. in
absence of deviations. However, in order to assess whether an equilibrium is robust
or not, we focus on (a) buyer’s best response upon observing an off equilibrium price,
given that other buyers are still playing the equilibrium strategy; and (b) given buyers’
best response, a seller’s incentive to deviate, given that other sellers are still playing
their equilibrium strategies. Accordingly, since we are looking at a market with a
9This implies that, in determining the hypothetical best response, the probability to obtain the
good at the new price is one.
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large number of buyers and sellers, the deviations we are analysing, which involve one
seller/buyer, should not affect the probability to sell/buy at the old prices. Thus,
denoting with K∗(p∗) and J∗(p∗) the probabilities to buy and sell at some equilibrium
price p∗ ∈ p∗ respectively, we maintain that these remain unchanged when agents
contemplate the possibility to deviate. To strengthen the argument, note that the
approach we are taking is conservative. In small markets or if more than one seller
deviates simultaneously, K(p∗, α1∗|a0) must me either equal or lower than K∗(p∗)
since, if anything, the number of sellers selling at p∗ is lower following the deviation.
Hence, the level of the payoff from buying at p∗ is either equal or lower than it was in
equilibrium.
A second problem refers to the beliefs to be assigned to the sellers who did not
deviate. Since a0 contains a price that is never announced in equilibrium, the equi-
librium assigns probability zero to the realization a0, which, in principle, might have
an effect on the beliefs that buyers assign to sellers who stick to p∗. However, this
problem is ruled out by the standard requirement stated in point iii) of definition 1.
Since the seller who deviated does not possess any information about the quality of
sellers who did not deviate that is not available also to the buyers, the deviation should
not change buyers’ beliefs about these sellers.
In short, the above discussion implies that, after the deviation p, buyers will still
be able to obtain what was their expected equilibrium payoff before the deviation, as
long as they keep playing their equilibrium strategies. Having said that, we now turn
to the analysis of different refinements and their consequences for the robustness of
type I FSE.
4.1.1 Perfect sequential equilibria
A possible approach is to define as reasonable beliefs those beliefs derived from up-
dating rules that are credible in the sense put forward by Grossman and Perry (1986).
Accordingly, we shall require that the beliefs following the observation of an off-
equilibrium price satisfy the following restriction. Whenever there exists a set of
qualities Q ⊆ l, h, such that if
1. Each type q ∈ Q weakly benefits from the deviation if it is thought that a type
q ∈ Q deviated;
2. Types q /∈ Q weakly lose from the deviation if it is thought that a type q ∈ Q
has deviated;
then buyers should believe that a seller of quality q ∈ Q has deviated.
Accordingly, we can then refine the concept of PBE by adding the credibility
requirement for the beliefs updating rule to definition (1). Formally,
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Definition 3. A PBE is said to satisfy the sequential perfection restriction (SPR)
if the belief function σ satisfies the following property. Let Q ⊆ {l, q} be any set of
qualities. For all Q such that, for some p /∈ p∗,
pis(p, a−s|q, σ) ≥ pi∗s(q) ∀q ∈ Q (6)
pis(p, a−s|q, σ) ≤ pi∗s(q) ∀q /∈ Q (7)
σ must satisfy
σ = σ(q|p) = Pr(q)/Pr(Q), (8)
where Pr(.) is the prior and pi∗s(q) is the equilibrium payoff for a seller of type q.
The effect of imposing such a restriction on the type I equilibria discussed in lemma
(1) is made clear by the following result:
Lemma 2. a. Given (1 − λ) > θ, there exist FSE of type I that satisfy the SPR;
b. Given (1 − λ) ≤ θ, there exist FSE of type I that satisfy the SPR if and only if
λ ≤ λˆ ≡ v(h)−u(l)
u(h)−u(l) .
Proof. See appendix.
This implies that the separating equilibrium where high quality sellers stay off the
market because of asymmetric information satisfies the sequential perfection restriction
if low quality sellers are the long side of the market.
When low quality sellers are instead the short side, such an equilibrium satisfies
the requirement of sequential perfection only if the prior probability to sample a high
quality is low enough. In this situation, all sellers have incentive to deviate to some
p ≥ v(h) so that the only credible beliefs are σ(l|p) = 1− λ and σ(h|p) = λ. In other
words, the credible beliefs upon observing a deviation are equal to the priors. So long
as λ > λˆ, buyers are willing to buy at p. Hence, the equilibrium will be deviated.
Consider now both conditions simultaneously: λ ≥ 1 − θ (type l are the short side),
and λ ≤ λˆ (robustness). If 1−θ > λˆ, for any prior λ implying that type l are the short
side, there is no robust equilibrium of type I. To understand this implication, note
that λˆ is increasing in v(h)− u(l) and decreasing in u(h)− u(l). Hence, if v(h)− u(l)
is small (announcing a price close to buyers’ reservation price for the low quality is
feasible for the high quality), or if the gap in terms of buyers’ utility between the two
qualities, u(h) − u(l), is large, there is no robust equilibrium in which high quality
sellers stay off-market. This means that whenever high quality sellers are keen to sell
their commodities and buyers attach great value to quality, equilibria in which high
quality sellers do not announce any price are not robust. Surprisingly, this discussion
does not apply, so that a type I robust equilibrium always exists, if the low quality
sellers outnumber the buyers. In this case competition among the low quality sellers
becomes so fierce that eventually drives the high quality out of the market.
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It is interesting to note that the robustness condition stated in lemma (2) for the
case 1− λ ≤ θ is equivalent to the condition for the existence of an equilibrium where
all qualities are traded in the standard textbook’s model of adverse selection, where
trade takes place at a single price set by an auctioneer. The condition λ > λˆ in fact
implies that there exists a price p ≥ v(h) at which buyers are willing to buy a pooling
of the two qualities. We shall see in the next subsection that most of these intuitions
hold true also for the Divinity criterion put forward by Banks and Sobel (1987).
However, one could ask whether σ(h|p) = λ can be further restricted. Such a doubt
is motivated by noting that in equilibria where p∗ = u(l), low quality sellers - who
are making strictly positive profits - can be made worse or better off by deviating.
By contrast, high quality sellers have nothing to lose, whatever the buyers’ response.
Thus, it seems compelling that, upon observing a deviation p ≥ v(h), sellers should
assign a higher probability (than the prior) to high quality sellers.
This idea of comparing the opportunity costs is made somewhat more explicit in
the refinements discussed in the next subsection.
4.1.2 Divine and D1-robust equilibria
A second approach, alternative to the one discussed in the previous subsection, is to
follow Banks and Sobel (1987) notion of Divine Equilibria and Cho and Kreps (1987)
version of their concept of Universal Divinity, known as D1. We remand to these works
for a general discussion of these refinements in standard signaling games.
Consider an equilibrium and assume that an individual seller deviates and an-
nounces price p. If, at the off equilibrium price p, beliefs are given by σ, buyers’
expected payoff from buying at p for a given profile of mixed actions α1 is:
pib(p, α
1
−b|a0, σ) = K(p, α1|a0){σ(h|p)[u(h)− p] + (1− σ(h|p))[u(l)− p]}, (9)
where a0 comprises the set of prices p∗ and the deviation p. Given some beliefs σˆ, let




−b|a0, σˆ) ∀b ∈ B, α1
′
b ∈ Ab} (10)
denote the set of profiles α1 that are formed by best responses when beliefs at p are
given by σˆ. In other words, α1 ∈MBRP (σˆ, a0) is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame
played by buyers when a0 is realized and beliefs are given by σˆ.10 Define αˆ a profile
of mixed actions that makes low quality sellers indifferent between deviating to p
and announcing p∗. Let J l(p, αˆ) be the probability to sell associated with αˆ, i.e., for
p > v(l),
pi∗s(l) = J
l(p, αˆ)[p− v(l)], (11)
10Note that we consider profiles of mixed best responses because we have more than one receiver
(buyer).
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where pi∗s(l) is the equilibrium payoff of the seller. Then, whenever the probability
to sell when deviating, J(p, α), is greater than J l, low quality sellers would always
deviate. Similarly, high quality sellers would always deviate if
J(p, α) > Jh, (12)
where, for p > v(h),11
pi∗s(h) = J
h(p, α˜)[p− v(h)] (13)
and α˜ is the profile that makes high quality sellers indifferent between the deviation









{α1 ∈MBRP (σˆ, a0) : J(p, α) > Jh}. (15)
According to Divinity, then, off equilibrium beliefs should satisfy the following
restriction: whenever R1 ⊂ R2, σ(h|p) ≥ λ must hold. Thus, if, for some deviation
p, high quality sellers have incentive to deviate in any situation in which low quality
sellers have a weak incentive to deviate, the posterior probability that the seller is of
high quality should not decrease after observing p. The next lemma gives necessary
and sufficient conditions for R1 ⊂ R2.
Lemma 3. Assume R2 is non-empty. Then, R1 ⊂ R2 if and only if J l > Jh.
Proof See appendix.
Hence, an equilibrium fails divinity if, for some p > v(h), the condition J l > Jh
holds and there is some buyer who prefers to buy at p rather than at p∗, given her
refined beliefs. This last condition reduces to
λ(u(h)− p) + (1− λ)(u(l)− p) >
K∗(p∗){σ∗(h|p∗)[u(h)− p∗] + (1− σ∗(h|p∗))[u(l)− p∗]}. (16)




p− v(h) , (17)
11In general, high quality sellers never deviate to any p < v(h) while low quality sellers never
deviate to any p < v(l). This implies that, upon observing a deviation to a price p ∈ (v(l), v(h)),
sellers should conclude that the deviation comes from low quality sellers.
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which can be interpreted as follows. pi∗s(q)/p−v(q) is the ratio between the opportunity
cost of deviating and the gains from the deviation. If the ratio is larger for low quality
sellers, sellers who deviated should be assigned a probability to be high quality at least
equal to the prior λ. The following result illustrates the effect of imposing the divinity
restriction on type I equilibria:
Lemma 4. a. Given (1− λ) > θ, there exist FSE of type I that are divine; b. Given
(1− λ) ≤ θ, there exist divine FSE of type I if and only if λ ≤ λˆ ≡ v(h)−u(l)
u(h)−u(l) .
Proof. See appendix.
As implied by sequential perfection, Divinity eliminates type I FSE where low
quality sellers are the short side of the market, whenever λ exceeds the critical value
λˆ. By contrast, type I FSE equilibria where low quality sellers are the long side of
the market are always robust to divinity. In this case, price competition forces low
quality sellers to accept zero profits in equilibrium. High quality sellers experience
zero profits as well since they choose not to trade. Therefore, both types of sellers
face no opportunity cost of deviating, which implies that deviations have no signaling
content.
The analysis of robustness of FSE of type I can be pushed one step further by
invoking D1. If, for some deviation p > v(h), R1 ⊂ R2 holds, then D1 implies that
type l deviates to p with probability zero. Similarly to Divinity, an equilibrium fails
D1 if there is some p > v(h) at which at least one buyer is willing to buy given beliefs
that assign probability zero to type l. In other words, for the equilibrium to be robust,
at any possible price at which the buyer is willing to buy if he thinks the seller is
high quality, low quality sellers should be at least as willing to deviate as high quality





holds, for any p such that
u(h)− p > K∗(p∗){σ∗(h|p∗)[u(h)− p∗] + (1− σ∗(h|p∗))[u(l)− p∗]}, (19)
i.e. for any p that makes buyers willing to deviate. Then
Lemma 5. a. Given (1− λ) > θ, there exist FSE of type I that satisfy D1; b. Given
(1− λ) ≤ θ, no FSE of type I satisfies D1.
Proof. See appendix.
D1 therefore permits to eliminate FSE of type I when low quality sellers are the
short side of the market and make profits pi∗(l) = u(l)−v(l) thereby extracting all the
surplus from the buyers. As we argued above, such an equilibrium does not appear
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fully justifiable since low quality sellers face a large opportunity cost of deviating,
whereas high quality sellers cannot be made worse off by the deviation since their
equilibrium profits equal zero. It follows that, upon observing a deviation, buyers
should infer that the seller deviating is high quality. Note that D1 is stronger than
divinity since it requires that off-equilibrium beliefs assign probability zero to the type
that has less incentive to deviate.
By contrast, when low quality sellers are the long side of the market, the oppor-
tunity cost of a hypothetical deviation is the same for low and high quality sellers.
Thus, buyers cannot rule out that the deviation comes from low quality sellers and
the equilibrium is therefore robust.
The following proposition summarizes the findings for type I equilibria:
Proposition 1. a. When 1− λ > θ there exists a robust FSE of type I such that all
trade occurs at a unique price p∗ = v(l) and in which only the low quality is traded. b.
When 1− λ ≤ θ, any FSE of type I is not, in general, robust.
This is implied by the analysis of lemmata 1-5 and, therefore, does not require any
formal proof. So far we analysed the robustness of equilibria in which only low quality
sellers are on the market. Because of the relevance of these equilibria, we explored the
robustness by means of alternative criteria. We now turn our attention to whether
there exist any robust equilibria in which both qualities are on the market. In this,
we take a conservative approach by focusing only on D1.
5 Pooling and Hybrid equilibria
In this section we assess the robustness of pure pooling and hybrid equilibria. In doing
so, we shall restrict our attention to the D1 critierion.
In any pure pooling equilibrium, by definition, there is a single equilibrium price
p∗ at which both high and low qualities are traded. In other words, all sellers sell
at the same price p∗, which implies that they have the same probability to sell J∗.
Equilibrium profits are pi∗s(l) = J
∗[p∗ − v(l)] and pi∗s(h) = J∗[p∗ − v(h)] for low and




p− v(h) , (20)
which implies
v(h)(p− p∗) ≤ v(l)(p− p∗). (21)
Condition (19) requires
u(h)− p > K∗(p∗){λ[u(h)− p∗] + (1− λ)[u(l)− p∗]} (22)
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for p∗ ≤ K∗(p∗){λ[u(h)− p∗] + (1− λ)[u(l)− p∗]}.
Regarding hybrid equilibria, it is crucial to note that in such equilibria the same
types of sellers are playing different actions. This implies that expected payoffs must
be the same across the equilibrium prices, for any given seller’s type. Then, we can
choose the payoff associated with any price played with positive probability by type q
to be type q’s equilibrium payoff. Also, in any hybrid equilibrium, there is at least one
price p∗ at which both qualities are traded. Then, in order to assess the robustness
of any hybrid equilibrium, we can focus just on the incentives to deviate from p∗.
Accordingly, the equivalent of (22) for hybrid equilibria is
u(h)− p > K∗(p∗){σ∗(h|p∗)[u(h)− p∗] + (1− σ∗(h|p∗))[u(l)− p∗]}, (23)
while condition (20) stays unchanged. Note that since pooling occurs at p∗, σ∗(h|p∗)
must be strictly lower than one.
It is well known that D1 usually selects fully separating equilibria, discarding pool-
ing and hybrid equilibria. Cho and Sobel (1990) show that in monotonic signaling
games pooling may only occur at the upper bound of the action space if the action
space is bounded above. Their result is however based on a sorting condition that does
not always hold in this model.12 Nevertheless, the next lemma shows that D1 retains
the same effectiveness also in our set up:
Lemma 6. No pooling/hybrid equilibrium survives D1.
Proof. See Appendix.
In any pooling or hybrid equilibrium, sellers of type h have a higher incentive to
slightly increase their prices as they make lower equilibrium profits than sellers of type
l. Hence, they have again a lower opportunity cost of deviating. But buyers, aware
of this, should infer that the seller who deviates is of high quality. Note also that
in the case of a hybrid equilibrium (where different mixtures of high and low quality
sellers are charging different prices), the deviation that unravels the equilibrium might
need to be “closer” to the equilibrium price than in the pooling case, since the mix of
qualities on sale at p∗ does not necessarily reflect λ and 1− λ.
6 Type II separating equilibria: all types are on
the market
A FSE of type II is a PBE in which low quality sellers announce a price pl and high
quality sellers announce a price ph > pl. Note that in this case, prices constitute a
12The sorting condition is the following. Given p and p′ < p, whenever J(p, a)[p − v(l)] ≥
J(p′, a′)[p′ − v(l)], then J(p, a)[p − v(h)] > J(p′, a′)[p′ − v(h)]. This condition is always true in
our model provided that J(p, a) and J(p′, a) are strictly positive.
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perfect signal of quality: σ∗(h|ph) = 1, and σ∗(h|pl) = 0. Buyers obtain u(q) − p∗q,
with q = l, h, when buying at pq. In any type II equilibrium where both qualities are
traded, ph, pl satisfy
[pl − v(l)]J∗(pl) ≥ [ph − v(l)]J∗(ph) (24)
[ph − v(h)] J∗(ph) ≥ [pl − v(h)]J∗(pl) (25)
[u(l)− pl]K∗(pl) = [u(h)− ph]K∗(ph) (26)
v(l) ≤ pl ≤ u(l) (27)
v(h) ≤ ph ≤ u(h), (28)
where J∗(pq) = J(pq, α∗) and K∗(pq) = K(pq, α1∗|a0). The first and second inequali-
ties are the Incentive Compatibility Condition (ICC) for low and high quality sellers,
respectively. The third equality is the buyers’ ICC. Finally, the last two inequalities
refer to the participation constraints of buyers and sellers.
It can be easily verified that
Lemma 7. If 1− λ > θ there is no FSE where both qualities are traded.
This lemma does not require any formal proof once we note that in any equilibrium,
low quality sellers must make zero profits whenever they outnumber the buyers. If they
were not, they would undercut each other in order to increase their chance to sell their
commodity. Note that undercutting would induce buyers to buy since the worst belief
that buyers can assign to a seller announcing a price slightly lower than pl is that he is
type l with probability 1 and buyers were buying quality l (with probability 1) at pl.
In any equilibrium where the high quality is traded, ph ≥ v(h) holds. Announcing such
a price, would then ensure a strictly positive profit to low quality sellers. Therefore,
the ICC of low quality sellers could not be satisfied.
In the light of lemma 7, we assume that 1−λ ≤ θ in our quest for robust separating
equilibria. Again, in order to check robustness we focus on D1.
For ph > pl, the equilibrium incentive compatibility condition of low quality sellers
(ICCl), given by equation (24), dictates J
∗(pl) > J∗(ph). This implies J∗(ph) < 1.
An undercutting argument can be used to argue that J∗(pl) = 1. If it were not, low
quality sellers would engage in price competition to improve their chances to sell. As
we already noted, undercutting works among the low types since buyers’ beliefs would
never assign to any seller a quality lower than l. Accordingly, given the equilibrium




p− v(h) . (29)
From condition (29) and ICCl, it follows that a high quality seller would always signal
himself by deviating to any p > ph. Therefore, a necessary condition for the equilibrium
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to be robust is that K∗(ph) equals 1 whenever ph < u(h). If K∗(ph) were less than 1,
there would always exist a deviation p = ph + , with  > 0 small enough, such that a
buyer would be willing to buy at p since she would get the commodity with probability
one.
Hence, condition (19) becomes
u(h)− p > u(h)− ph. (30)
Note that, when K∗(ph) = 1, buyers may be interested in buying only if someone
deviates and announces a price p lower than ph. In fact, in separating equilibria buyers
already assign probability one to be a high quality seller to any seller posting ph.
Condition (29) can be rewritten as
p ≤ v(h)
pl − v(l)− v(l)v(h)J∗(ph)(ph − v(h))
pl − v(l)− J∗(ph)(ph − v(h)) . (31)
Note that the denominator is greater than zero from ICCl and that the term multi-
plying v(h) on the RHS is greater than 1 for ph > v(h).
Since the equilibrium is robust when condition (31) holds for any p < ph, we can
replace p by ph without any loss of generality:
ph ≤ v(h)
pl − v(l)− v(l)v(h)J∗(ph)(ph − v(h))
pl − v(l)− J∗(ph)(ph − v(h)) . (32)
In any robust FSE ph and pl must satisfy the above condition. Note that ph → v(h)
as J∗(ph)→ 0. This means that as the demand for high quality falls, the price should
tend to the sellers’ reservation price. This is not generally implied by the concept
of PBE because off-equilibrium beliefs may deter sellers from lowering their prices
in order to improve the chances to sell. The competitive behaviour among the high
types comes back to life when off-equilibrium beliefs are chosen to satisfy D1. On the
other hand, D1 does not imply that whenever J∗(ph) < 1 high quality sellers should
announce v(h). As we argue below, in equilibrium high quality sellers might make
positive profits (ph > v(h)) even if J(ph) < 1.
Lemma 8. Assume θ > 1 − λ. Then: i) both qualities are traded in any robust
equilibrium; ii) the ICC of low quality sellers holds with strict equality whenever ph >
v(h).
Proof. See appendix.
The fact that the low quality is traded should not surprise. More interesting is the
fact that the the high quality is traded too. The argument given in the proof goes
along the following lines. As long as buyers experience positive surplus in equilibrium,
19
all buyers should be on the market. However, if θ > 1− λ, the low quality sellers are
not enough to satisfy all the demand. Thus, they will raise their prices until some
of the buyers will decide to buy from the high quality sellers. On the other hand,
if buyers do not make any surplus (pl = u(l)), given that the ICCl must hold with
equality, low quality sellers are indifferent between charging ph and charging pl. But
then, since charging pl gives positive profits, the probability to sell at ph must also be
positive, which implies that quality h is always traded.
The intuition of why the ICCl must hold with equality is subtle. We have noted
that in fully separating equilibria the only possible way to gain from a deviation is to
announce a price slightly lower than ph, hoping to be able to sell with a probability
higher than J∗(ph). High quality sellers are willing to deviate whenever the gains from
the increase in the probability to sell outweights the loss due to the small reduction
in the price they charge. If the ICCl does not hold with equality, low quality sellers
strictly prefer pl to ph. Therefore, they are not necessarily willing to deviate if the
gains for the increase in probability just outweight the loss from the reduction in
price. Because of that, reasonable beliefs require that the deviation comes from the
high quality. By contrast, when the ICCl holds with equality, low quality sellers are
indifferent between pl and ph. Therefore, they are willing to deviate whenever the high
quality are, which makes the equilibrium robust.
An alternative way to interpret the result is that price competition among the high
types is limited by buyers’ fear that low types may step in if the probability to sell at
ph becomes too large. Hence, price competition among sellers of type h stops when
the demand at ph is such that low quality sellers are indifferent between announcing
ph and announcing pl. Limited price competition causes high quality sellers’ profits to
remain positive, even when J∗(ph) < 1.
In what follows, two parameters will be crucial. Define
δ ≡ GFTl
u(h)− v(l) ∈ (0, 1) (33)
and
γ ≡ ∆GFT
v(h)− v(l) , (34)
where, for one unit of quality q, GFTq ≡ u(q) − v(q) measures the gains from trade,
and ∆GFT = GFTh − GFTl. Note that γ < δ holds. δ represents the overall gains
from trading the low quality scaled by the range of feasible prices u(h) − v(l), while
γ is the difference in the gains from trade between the two qualities, ∆GFT , over the
difference in the seller’s evaluation of the two qualities v(h)− v(l). γ > 0 implies that
the gains from trading the low quality are higher than those from trading the high
quality.
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Lemma 9. When θ ≥ 1− λ, there exist robust FSE of type II. The unique outcome






, ii) prices announced by type h and type l sellers are:
• ph = u(h), pl = u(l) if θ ≥ 1− λ+ λδ;
• ph = v(l)+ λ1−θ [u(h)−u(l)] and pl = v(l)+ θ−(1−λ)1−θ [u(h)−u(l)] if 1−λ+γλI{γ>0} <
θ < 1− λ+ λδ;
• ph = v(h), pl = u(l)− [u(h)− v(h)] if 1− λ ≤ θ ≤ 1− λ+ λγI{γ>0};
where I{γ>0} : R→ {0, 1} is the indicator function.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 9 implies that equilibrium prices are unique and crucially depend on the
buyers to sellers ratio, θ. If θ is large, trade occurs at the buyers’ reservation prices:
u(h) and u(l). If θ is small, trade occurs at prices that leave positive surplus to
the buyers. For θ large/small we mean that θ is greater/smaller than the maximum
fraction of total buyers who can trade without violating the ICC−l, which is 1−λ+λδ.
Note that in this case θ − (1− λ) is the number of buyers who do not manage to buy
the low quality. When θ − (1 − λ) is larger than λδ there are buyers who do not
manage to buy either quality. At the same time, high quality sellers sell at u(h) with a
probability to sell δ < 1. Otherwise, the ICC of low quality sellers would be violated.
This is the adverse effect due to asymmetric information in this model: there may
be buyers and sellers who do not trade even if trade would be mutually beneficial.
However, D1, by requiring that the ICCl holds with equality, selects the equilibrium
where the amount of trade is maximised. Thus, it picks the equilibrium in which the
inefficiency is minimised, among all the possible FSE.
If γλ < θ − (1 − λ) < λδ or γ ≤ 0, prices are given by a markup over the lowest
possible price v(l). In this case, it can be shown (see the appendix) that the probability
to buy at pl must be equal to 1. This implies that all buyers who do not buy at pl
are buying at ph. 1 − λ + λδ − θ represents the total fraction of sellers who could
potentially sell their commodities without violating the ICC (if the number of buyers
were large enough) minus the actual number of buyers over the total number of sellers.
When θ − (1 − λ) ≤ γλ and γ > 0, such that the low quality gives higher gains
than the high quality, the ICC of low quality sellers cannot hold with equality. Thus,
the only possible price high quality sellers can announce is v(h). This becomes rather
intuitive once we note that γ > 0 implies that the gains from trading the high quality
are small if compared with the gains from the low quality. Thus, in order to trade,
high quality sellers should give up their profits: ph = v(h). Low quality sellers will
then announce the highest possible price at which buyers are willing to buy the low
quality, given the option to buy the high quality at v(h).
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The overall behaviour of the market prices is discontinuous in θ. This is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Finally, note that lemma 9 gives a strong economic rationale for the use of D1 as
equilibrium concept. Since it requires that the amount of high quality traded is the
highest possible and imposes ph = u(h) whenever there are ex-post unsatisfied buyers,
it implies that there is no ex-post incentive for unsatisfied buyers to buy from the high
quality sellers who did not manage to sell their commodities.
7 When is the high quality harder to trade? An-
swer based on D1
From the analysis of type II equilibria we know that when θ ≥ 1− λ, the only robust
equilibria are type II and give a unique outcome in terms of prices and quantities.
When θ < 1− λ, a robust equilibrium of type I, where high quality sellers stay out of
the market, exists and is robust. However, this does not ensure that the equilibrium
outcome is unique in this case. The next lemma shows that the property of a unique
outcome holds for all D1-robust equilibria.
Lemma 10. Given the values of the parameters θ, λ, u(l), v(l), u(h), v(h), all the
resulting D1-robust equilibria display the same outcome in terms of traded qualities,
quantities, and prices at which trade occurs.
Proof See appendix.
The intuition is that when θ < 1 − λ the high quality is never traded. Thus,
whether high quality sellers stay on the market and announce prices at which no trade
occurs or stay out of the market does not affect the traded quantity and the price at
which trade takes place.
This uniqueness property permits to analyse the behaviour of the traded quantities
as market conditions change. The following result describes how the amount of high
quality traded varies with θ:
Proposition 2. In any D1-robust equilibrium: i. The fraction of quality l commodi-
ties being traded (over the total supply of quality l) is min[θ/(1 − λ), 1]; ii. The










The proposition is implied by the combined analysis of lemmata 5-10 and the law
of large numbers. Thus, it does not require any proof.
The result is intuitive. If low quality sellers outnumber buyers (θ < 1 − λ), price
competition forces them to sell their commodities at the lowest feasible price. This
effect accentuates the effect of adverse selection, making the high quality impossible to
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trade. In this case, whether high quality sellers announce a price or not is irrelevant.
By converse, if low quality sellers are less than the buyers, price competition at the
low price is less fierce. Also, in this case, robustness requires that high quality sellers
should never remain out of the market (i.e. they always announce a price). This
ensures that the high quality is traded in equilibrium, though, for high quality sellers,
the probability to make a sale is less than one.
Inspection of the expression in proposition 2, shows a discontinuous relationship
between the relative demand, θ, and the percentage of high quality sold. If θ ≤ 1− λ,
the high quality is never traded. If θ > 1 − λ the amount of high quality trade
linearly increases in θ. However, the percentage of high quality traded cannot grow
too much as to violate the incentive compatibility of low quality sellers. Hence, when
θ− (1−λ) ≥ λδ, the amount of high quality being traded must remain constant. This
is depicted in figure 2.
A close look at the parameter δ = u(l)−v(l)
u(h)−v(l) , reveals the presence of a “superior-
quality’s curse”. Since δ is decreasing in u(h), if the high quality is extremely appre-
ciated by buyers, the probability to sell it must be very low. The intuition is that if
u(h) is large, the price of the high quality should be very high. On the other hand,
separation requires that the incentive compatibility of low quality sellers is satisfied.
Thus, the probability to sell the high quality must be low.
To conclude the section, we give a brief account of what happens in the case the
assumption v(h) > u(l) is violated. The reader should note that the analysis of robust
equilibria is exactly the same. What changes are the characteristics of some non-
robust equilibria. For instance, in the equilibrium of type I where θ > 1−λ, it is clear
that low quality sellers would always announce a price slightly below v(h) instead of
announcing u(l). The existence of some pooling and hybrid equilibria is also affected.
8 Implications for efficiency
In this section we analyze the welfare implications of the model with strategic price-
setting, by comparison with the perfect competition case, where buyers are fully in-
formed, which provides the first best benchmark. In doing so, we shall concentrate
on the equilibria robust to the D1 criterion. As an additional term of comparison,
we shall also refer to the equilibrium outcome(s) of a Walrasian model of centralized
market, where trade occurs at a single price set by an auctioneer.
Under perfect competition, both the quantities and the qualities exchanged are
always those which maximise the ex post gains from trade. Depending on whether
∆GFT > 0 holds or not, the corresponding level of welfare being generated through
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the exchange when markets are perfect is
WFI =
{
GFTlmin(B, S) + ∆GFT min(B, λS) if ∆GFT > 0
GFTlmin(B, S) + ∆GFT max[min(B, S)− (1− λ)]S, 0] if ∆GFT < 0.
(35)
Based on proposition 2, the welfare level generated by the model with strategic
price setting and asymmetric information can be written as
W =

GFTlB if B ∈ [0, (1− λ)S)
GFTlB +∆GFT (B − 1− λ)S if B ∈ [S(1− λ), S(1− λ+ δλ)]
GFTlS(1− λ+ δλ) + δλS∆GFT if B ∈ (S(1− λ+ δλ),∞).
(36)
We compare (36) and (35) in each of the following two distinct cases:
a. Gains from trading quality l exceed gains from trading quality h: ∆GFT < 0;
b. Gains from trading quality h exceed gains from trading quality l: ∆GFT > 0.
Let us focus on case (a), first. On the basis of (35) and (36), the relative welfare loss
associated with the model where sellers announce the prices is




0 if θ ≤ 1− λ+ δλ
1− GFTl(1−λ+δλ)+λδ∆GFT
min(θ,1)GFTl+∆GFT max(min(θ,1)−(1−λ),0) if θ > 1− λ+ δλ.
(37)
According to this expression, the market with strategic price-setting achieves the
first best level of welfare as long as θ ≤ (1 − λ + δλ). Viceversa, if θ > (1 − λ + δλ),
an inefficiency emerges due to the fact that there is too little trade. D1 selects the
equilibria in which the amount of trade is maximised given the ICC of low quality
sellers. As a consequence, the market suffers an efficiency loss if and only if the
demand is sufficiently large. The behaviour of ∆wFI is described in figure 3, which
shows how ∆wFI increases with θ.
It is worth noting that, under the same circumstances, the centralized Walrasian
market where trade occurs at a single price could potentially lead to a different out-
come. As long as θ < (1 − λ) this model would imply a unique equilibrium where
only quality l would be traded and, again, that outcome would be efficient. However,
whenever θ > (1 − λ), we have to distinguish two possible situations depending on
whether λ ≥ λˆ holds or not, where λˆ has been defined in lemma 2. If this inequality is
not satisfied, then the Walrasian model leads a unique equilibrium where only quality
l is exchanged, and the amount of trade equals S(1 − λ). This outcome would be
inefficient as long as θ > (1− λ) holds.
On the other hand, if λ ≥ λˆ, the hypothesis of price-taking behaviour leads to two
possible equilibria: (i) a separating equilibrium where only quality l is traded, in the
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amount S(1−λ); (ii) a pooling equilibrium where both qualities are traded. Here, the
amount of trade would be min(B, S), of which a share (1 − λ) would be of quality l
and λ would be of quality h. Clearly enough, under the separating equilibrium the
welfare loss implied by the Walrasian model is still greater than the welfare loss, if
any, associated with the strategic-price setting model.
Things are different under the pooling equilibrium. The level of welfare of the
Walrasian model in this case is
WW = GFTlmin(B, S) + λ∆GFT [min(B, S)]. (38)
Let ∆wW denote the welfare loss implied by the strategic price setting model rel-
atively to the Walrasian model. Taking into account that for θ ≤ 1− λ the Walrasian
model and the model with strategic price setting share the same outcome, and com-
paring (38) and (36) yields




0 if θ ∈ [0, 1− λ]
1− GFTl+∆GFT (1−(1−λ)/θ)
GFTl+λ∆GFT
if θ ∈ (1− λ, 1− λ+ δλ)
1− GFTl(1−λ+δλ)+λδ∆GFT
min(θ,1)GFTl+ λ∆GFT min(θ,1)
if θ ∈ [1− λ+ δλ,∞).
(39)
As depicted in figure 4, ∆wW is zero for θ ∈ [0, 1− λ], negative for θ less or equal to
θˆ, and positive otherwise, where
θˆ =
GFTl(1− λ+ λδ) + δλ∆GFT
GFTl + λ∆GFT
. (40)
It can be easily verified that θˆ ∈ (1− λ+ δλ, 1).
Assume the Walrasian auctioneer is able to select the pooling equilibrium equilib-
rium, so that trade is maximised. Then, as the value of θ increases, the Walrasian
market will eventually outperform the decentralized market where sellers are price-
setting. The intuition behind this result is that, so long as pooling equilibria are
selected, the Walrasian market, differently from the other model, provides the efficient
amount of trade for any value of θ > (1 − λ). Certainly, the quality of trade could
still be different from that of the first best case. However, from the point of view of
efficiency, the quality aspect of trade becomes less of an issue compared to quantity
as θ increases. This is why, for θ sufficiently high, the Walrasian model outperforms
the model with strategic price setting.
Let us now turn to the case (b), in which the gains from trading quality l are less
than the gains from trading quality h. In this case, the model with strategic price-
setting never yields an efficient outcome. The relative welfare loss with respect to the
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if θ ∈ [0, 1− λ]
1− GFTlθ+∆GFT [θ−(1−λ)]
θGFTl+∆GFT min(θ,λ))
if θ ∈ (1− λ, 1− λ+ δλ)
1− GFTl(1−λ+δλ)+δλ∆GFT
GFTlmin(θ,1)+min(θ,λ)∆GFT
if θ ∈ [1− λ+ δλ,∞).
(41)
The behaviour of wFI is described in figure 5, where the wFI has been drawn under
the hypothesis that λ < 0.5 holds (the graph does not change significantly if the other
case is considered). As figure 5 shows, strategic price setting always results in a welfare
loss. As θ increases and some of the h quality starts to be traded, the loss decreases.
But then, as θ reaches the maximum percentage of the overall supply which can be
traded under strategic price setting, 1 − λ + δλ, the relative loss shoots up again to
reach its maximum value for θ = 1.
What is the welfare loss associated with the Walrasian model under case (b)? The
relative welfare loss of our model compared to the Walrasian centralized market is
still given by expression (39), where ∆GFT is now greater than zero. The behaviour
of ∆ww is described in figure 6. For any θ > 1 − λ the model with strategic price
setting gives a lower welfare than the Walrasian model. This, provided that a pooling
equilibrium exists and the Walrasian auctioneer selects it. The loss decreases for values
of θ between 1−λ and 1−λ+ δλ as quality h starts to be traded, and increases again
for values of θ greater than 1 − λ + δλ due to the high quality’s curse. Assume that
λ ≥ λˆ and the Walrasian auctioneer always selects the equilibrium in which trade
is maximised. Then, for θ ≥ 1, the Walrasian market yields the first best level of
welfare. By contrast, in the market with strategic pricing, too little trade occurs and
an excessively high proportion of quality l is exchanged.
Summing up, if the demand is less than the supply of low quality, both the Wal-
rasian and the strategic price setting models yield the same result. Otherwise, the
welfare implications of the two models can be very different. If the pooling equilib-
rium which maximises trade in the Walrasian model does not exist, then strategic
price-setting generally yields a superior outcome in terms of welfare. If, on the other
hand, the pooling equilibrium exists, then the Walrasian model could do better. This
certainly happens if ∆GFT > 0 and might happen when ∆GFT < 0 but only if
demand is strong enough to trigger the inefficiency caused by the high quality’s curse
that plagues the model with strategic pricing.
9 Extension to any finite number of qualities
This section generalises the results concerning the set of equilibria robust to D1 to the
case of a finite number (N + 1) of qualities. Qualities are indexed by q = 0, ..., N .
Each seller’s quality is drawn from a distribution λ : {0, 1, ..., N} → [0, 1], where λq,
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∑N
q=0 λq = 1, denotes the probability associated with quality q. Buyers’ posterior
beliefs are denoted by σ(q|a0s),
∑N
q=0 σ(q|a0s) = 1.
Let us concentrate first on pooling and hybrid equilibria in which two or more
types of sellers announce the same price. In order to assess the robustness of these
equilibria, we need to understand how the equivalents of conditions (20) and (22) look
like. In any of these equilibria there always exists a price p∗ at which a non-singleton
non-empty set of qualities, M ⊆ {0, ..., N}, is traded. Let qM be the highest quality




p− v(qM) , (42)
which, given v(q) < v(qM), is violated for any p > p
∗. Thus, reasonable beliefs should
assign probability 0 to a deviation p > p∗ by any quality in M except for qM . As for
qualities q /∈M , the following applies. Sellers of qualities q < qM who do not trade at
p∗ do so because they make higher profits charging a different price. Therefore, they
should be assigned probability zero. Sellers of qualities q > qM should also be assigned
probability zero so long as p < v(qM + 1). Thus, deviations p
∗ < p < v(qM + 1) are
attributed to sellers of quality M with probability 1. As for buyers, the equivalent of
condition (22) is:




which is always true for p close enough to p∗. Thus, neither pooling nor hybrid
equilibria in which two or more types announce the same price survive D1.
The set of robust equilibria therefore includes only fully separating equilibria and
partially separating equilibria with the necessary condition that sellers on the market
fully separate. We now focus on these equilibria. If θ ≤ λ0, the discussion made in
the previous sections leads to the immediate conclusion that only quality 0 is traded
and the only price in the market is p0 = v(0). When θ > λ0, in general, more than
one quality is traded. In this case, the relevant incentive compatibility condition for
sellers is:
J(pq−s)[pq−s − v(q − s)] ≥ J(pq)[pq − v(q − s)] (44)
for all q and s = 0, ...q. The usual undercutting argument implies that J(p0) = 1
holds. This, together with (44) yields pq > pq−1 > ... > p0 and J(pq) < J(pq−1) < ... <
J(p1) < 1. From equation (44):
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)] ≥ J(pq)[pq − v(q − 1)] (45)
and
J(pq)[pq − v(q)] ≥ J(pq+1)[pq+1 − v(q)]. (46)
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Then, by using v(q) > v(q − 1) and J(pq) > J(pq+1), it follows that
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)] ≥ J(pq+1)[pq+1 − v(q − 1)] (47)
always holds. Therefore, when the “adjacent upward” ICC is satisfied, all the ICC
with respect to all higher qualities must be satisfied.
As explained in section (6), in any robust equilibrium in which buyers make a
positive surplus, K∗(pq) must be 1 for any quality q that is traded in equilibrium.
Then, Buyers’ ICC is:
u(q)− pq = k ∀q = 0, 1, ..., N, (48)
where k is buyers’ net payoff from buying any of the qualities.
For q > 0, buyers may only be attracted by deviations p < pq, since they are
already able to buy quality q with probability 1 at pq. This implies that only p < pq
are relevant deviations. D1 implies that type q should be assigned probability zero of





This is the equivalent of condition (29).
Lemma 11. For all q = 1, ..., N , in any robust equilibrium in which quality q is traded,
the “adjacent upward” ICC of sellers of quality q − 1 holds with equality whenever
pq > v(q).
Proof See appendix.
We now characterise the robust equilibria. Assume that all sellers announce a price
pq > v(q) and all qualities are traded. We rewrite the sellers’ ICCs to obtain
J(pq) = J(pq−1)
u(q − 1)− v(q − 1)− k
u(q)− v(q − 1)− k . (50)




u(q − i− 1)− v(q − i− 1)− k
u(q − i)− v(q − i− 1)− k . (51)
Since k ≥ 0, the maximum value of J(pq) is achieved when k = 0. Defining
δq ≡ u(q − 1)− v(q − 1)
u(q)− v(q − 1) . (52)






Note also that k = 0 implies pq = u(q) ∀q = 0, ..., N . Therefore, buyers make zero
surplus. Assume k > 0, so that buyers make positive surplus at every price. Then, all
buyers must stay on the market. This implies:
N∑
q=0
λqJ(pq) = θ, (54)
where J(pq) is given by (51). In this case, an equilibrium is a value k
∗ solving (54).
Inspection of expression (54) shows that the LHS is monotonically decreasing in k,
for 0 ≤ k ≤ u(q) − v(q) ∀q = 0, ..., N . Therefore, there always exists at most one
admissible k∗ in the above interval, which is also the relevant interval since it takes
into account sellers’ and buyers’ participation constraint. This also implies that if
there exists an equilibrium, it must be unique. Regarding the existence, consider the
following. The LHS of expression (54) reaches its maximum in the relevant interval
when k = 0 and its its minimum when k = kˆ ≡ minq∈{o,...,N} u(q) − v(q). Therefore,
















u(q − i− 1)− v(q − i− 1)− kˆ
u(q − i)− v(q − i− 1)− kˆ . (56)
Otherwise, if one of the above conditions is not satisfied, the robust equilibrium
takes a different form. If condition (55) is not satisfied, k is equal to zero and the
equilibrium is characterized by pq = u(q) for all q = 0, 1, ..., N and probabilities Jq
given by (53).
Assume now that condition (56) is not satisfied. Let Jq be the probability to sell
at pq when k equals kˆ, and note k ≤ kˆ must hold. If the value of the RHS of equation
(56) for k = kˆ is greater than θ, then some qualities are not traded. To see this, note
that Jq is zero for all q > qˆ, where qˆ = argminq∈{0,...,N} u(q) − v(q). 13 Thus, when
k = kˆ, all qualities above the quality which provides the lowest gain from trade are
13If the minimum is not unique, then Jq equals zero for all qualities above the lowest quality in
argminq∈{0,...,N} u(q)− v(q)).
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not traded. Buyers’ surplus k should increase, however it fails to increase because, by
increasing, it would violate the participation constraint of sellers of type qˆ. Hence, the
incentive compatibility for type qˆ requires that no higher quality is traded.
What are the characteristics of the equilibrium in this case? Note that if (56) is






λqJq > θ, (57)
where the first equality comes from the fact that all qualities higher than qˆ are not
traded. This suggests that even if only qˆ + 1 qualities are traded out of N + 1,
the quantity sold is still higher than the quantity bought. Then, quality qˆ cannot
be traded in equilibrium. Let us assume that quality qˆ − 1 is traded. It follows
that its price, pqˆ−1, must be compatible with D1. In other words, there must be
no incentive to deviate for sellers of type qˆ or above. Therefore, pqˆ−1 must be such
that k1 ≡ u(qˆ − 1) − pqˆ−1 ≥ u(qˆ) − v(qˆ). If so, there is no price sellers of type qˆ
could possibly announce to attract buyers and still make no loss. Of course, buyers
incentive compatibility implies u(q) − pq = k1 for all qualities that are traded, i.e.
q = 0, ..., qˆ−1. Let now q˜ ≡ argminq∈{0,...,qˆ−1} u(q)−v(q) denote the quality that gives
the lowest gain from trade among the traded qualities. It is clear that k1 should now
satisfy u(qˆ) − v(qˆ) ≤ k1 ≤ u(q˜) − v(q˜). Therefore, all that remains to be checked is






u(q − i− 1)− v(q − i− 1)− k∗1
u(q − i)− v(q − i− 1)− k∗1
= θ. (58)
If it does, then the equilibrium is such that qualities q = 0, ..., qˆ − 1 are traded. If it
does not, then all the process starts again by choosing q˜ as the first quality that is not
traded. It should be noted that, since we are assuming θ > λ0, the process eventually
leads to an equilibrium in which more than one quality is traded. In fact, as long as
θ > λ0, qualities 0 and 1 are always traded. Interestingly enough, if gains from trade
are non-decreasing in q, then all quality are necessarily traded in equilibrium. This
happens because the quality which displays the minimum gains is quality 0. Then, k
must be lower or equal to u(0)− v(0). As k reaches u(0)− v(0), the LHS in equation
(54) goes to λ0 since all J(pq) are zero except J(p0) which is equal to 1. Therefore, as
long as λ0 < θ, an internal solution in which all qualities are traded exists.
The extension to N + 1 qualities enables us to understand the special role that
the lowest quality has in our model. If θ ≤ λ0, then only the lowest quality is traded.
Otherwise, more than one quality is always traded and, possibly, all N+1 qualities are
traded. The lowest quality is peculiar because its trade is not plagued by information




This paper tackled the issue of strategic pricing in a competitive market for lemons
where the potential gains from trade are positive. The seller’s choice of announcing
a given price is affected by two types of considerations. The first is the desire to sell
at a price that ensures the highest net profit and, at the same time, maximises the
chance to find a buyer. The second is the willingness to conceal/reveal his true quality
through the price he announces.
By imposing standard restrictions on buyers’ beliefs upon observing a deviation
to a price that is never announced in equilibrium, we are able to fully charaterise
the set of robust equilibria. This is composed of fully separating equilibria in which
different types of sellers choose different actions. In these equilibria, the low quality is
always traded. Market conditions (the relative number of buyers to sellers) are crucial
in determining whether the best quality will be traded and in what amount. As the
relative demand increases, the two qualities are traded in sequence. In particular, if low
quality sellers are able to satisfy the whole demand, the high quality is never traded.
The idea is that competition among the low quality sellers becomes so fierce that their
profits are driven to zero. Under these circumstances, if the high quality were traded,
low quality sellers would always profit from announcing the price at which the high
quality is sold. Hence, incentive compatibility requires that high quality sellers never
trade. This result contravenes conventional wisdom in that it is independent of the
buyers’ and sellers’ relative evaluations of the two qualities. The high quality is never
traded even if the difference between the buyer and the seller reservation prices is
arbitrarily large.
If low quality sellers are not enough to satisfy the whole demand, then the high
quality is always traded, albeit the probability to make a sale for the individual sellers
is strictly less than 1. The reason is that the high quality can be only traded at
relatively high prices. Then, incentive compatibility for low quality sellers requires
that the chance to make a sale at those prices is small. As the demand grows, the
fraction of high quality goods exchanged increases until a threshold is reached and
remains thereafter constant. This implies that even if buyers outnumber sellers, there
are always sellers who are unable to sell their commodity.
When the demand is strong, we identify the presence of a quality paradox. The
more the best quality is appreciated by the potential buyers, the lower the amount that
is traded in equilibrium. The paper is also interesting from a technical viewpoint. We
consider strategic signaling in a competitive market characterised by a large number
of agents. Hence, our setup is ideal to study how agents’ competitive behaviour may
be limited by information imperfections. This is made possible by our assumption
that buyers observe the prices announced by individual sellers implying that prices
are signals of individual qualities rather than market-average qualities, as in early
works. Finally, the paper compares alternative solution concepts to identify the most
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reasonable outcome from an economic perspective.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
Any PBE of type I satisfies definition 2. A necessary condition for this to happen is
p∗ < v(h) for all p∗ ∈ p∗ so that posting p∗ is strictly dominated by a0∗s = n for any
seller of type h. Bayes’ rule then implies σ∗(h|p∗, a0∗−s) ≡ σ∗(h|p∗) = 0 for any p∗ ∈ p∗,
so that at p∗ buyers’ maximum willingness to pay equals u(l). But then, p∗ ≤ u(l)
must hold for any equilibrium price in a PBE of type I. Moreover, given that v(l)
is low quality sellers’ reservation price, p∗ ≥ v(l) must hold. Hence, in any PBE of
type I where p∗ is non-empty, u(l) ≥ p∗ ≥ v(l) for all p∗ ∈ p∗. We prove that: a.
The equilibrium is characterized by a unique price, if some price is announced; b. If
low quality sellers are the short (long) side, the equilibrium characterized by p∗ = u(l)
(p∗ = v(l)) is the only equilibrium where prices are announced; c. No seller announcing
a price is never an equilibrium.
a. Uniqueness of price. Suppose there is more than one price. Consider for instance
the case of two different equilibrium prices p′ and p′′ with p′′ > p′. Clearly, p′, p′′ could
be a pair of equilibrium prices if and only if pis(p
′, a∗−s|l, σ∗) = pis(p′′, a∗−s|l, σ∗) which
implies that sellers are the long side of the market at p′′ and the short side at p′ so that
J(p′′, α∗) < J(p′, α∗). Otherwise, posting p′ would be dominated by p′′. So, J(p′′, α∗)
must be lower than 1. But then, any seller posting p′′ would profit from lowering p′′
by an infinitesimal amount in order to attract buyers buying at p′′. It is important to
note that this deviation is profitable for any off-equilibrium beliefs of the buyers: the
quality assigned to such a deviation can never be lower than l. Moreover, given other
buyers’ actions, a single buyer who deviates and buys at this lower price, will be able
to buy with probability 1. The same reasoning applies to any number of prices higher
than one. Thus, the only possible equilibrium is when there is a single price p∗.
b. Short-long side. If (1− λ) > θ, sellers of type l are the long side of the market.
In this case, any p∗ > v(l) cannot be an equilibrium. Each individual seller would
have incentive to deviate and announce p∗ −  where  > 0 is sufficiently small, as an
infinitesimal reduction in the price would result in a non-infinitesimal positive change
in the level of profits since to the probability of selling jumps from θ/(1−λ) to 1. Again,
note that this deviation is profitable whatever buyers’ beliefs are. Undercutting leads
to p∗ = v(l). Clearly, undercutting makes no sense if (1 − λ) ≤ θ. In this case, each
seller of type l can charge the buyers the maximum price they are willing to pay.
Hence, if (1 − λ) ≤ θ, p∗ = u(l) must hold. Finally, for p∗ = u(l) and p∗ = v(l) to
be equilibrium prices, there must be a class of off-equilibrium beliefs such that none
has any incentive to announce a different price, greater than u(l). It is easy to verify
that such beliefs exist. For instance, beliefs assigning σ(h|p, a0∗−s) = 0 to any seller
announcing a price p 6= p∗ support the PBE.
c. p∗ = ø is never an equilibrium. Consider an equilibrium where all sellers
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are off the market, i.e. a0∗ = {n, n, ..., n}. Buyers would be willing to buy at any
price p < u(l) for any possible off equilibrium beliefs. Then, entering the market and
posting p ∈ (v(l), u(l)) is always profitable for a seller s of type l, since pis(p, a′−s|l, σ∗) >
pis(n, a
∗
−s|l, σ∗) = 0, where a′ is the action profile which includes buyers’ best response
to p. 
Proof of lemma 2
Case a. The equilibrium price is p∗ = v(l). Equilibrium profits are pi∗s(h) = pi
∗
s(l) = 0.
Set Q = {h} and σ(h|p) = 1. Then, provided that buyers have any incentive to buy,
all sellers would profit from deviating to any p ≥ v(h), while high quality sellers would
never deviate to any p < v(h). Thus, σ(h|p) = 1 would necessarily be disconfirmed.
Set now Q = {l} and σ(l|p) = 1. In this case, for any p > v(l), buyers’ expected
profits would be higher at p∗ than at p. Then, the best response is not to buy. Yet,
nor type l neither type h are actually made worse or better off by announcing p. But
then, since type l weakly benefits and type h weakly loses, σ(l|p) = 1 is credible.
Case b. The equilibrium price is p∗ = u(l). In equilibrium, low quality sellers make
profits pi∗s(l) = u(l)− v(l), while high quality sellers make zero profits and buyers zero
surplus. Set Q = {h}, so that σ(h|p) = 1. For this to be the case, p ≥ v(h) must
hold. Then, provided that p < u(h) buyers best reply is to buy at p. But then, any
of the sellers would profit from deviating so that σ(h|p) = 1 would be invalidated.
Hence, σ(h|p) = 1 is not credible. Set Q = {l} and σ(l|p) = 1. For any p > u(l) the
best reply is not to buy so that σ(l|p) = 1 is again disconfirmed and therefore is not
credible. Finally, set Q = {h, l}. Then assume a deviation p > v(h) (but close enough
to v(h)). Then, Pr(Q) = 1, Pr(h) = λ, and Pr(l) = 1− λ. If λu(h) + (1− λ)u(l) ≥ p,
the best response is to buy following the deviation. All sellers have an incentive to
deviate such that beliefs are confirmed. Thus, the equilibrium where p∗ = u(l) will be
deviated whenever λu(h) + (1− λ)u(l) > v(h). Solving for λ yields the threshold:
λˆ ≡ v(h)− u(l)
u(h)− u(l) . (59)
So if λ > λˆ the equilibrium outcome p∗ = u(l) does not satisfy the SPR. 
Proof of lemma 3
Clearly, whenever J l > Jh, R1 ⊆ R2 follows. Therefore, in order to prove the result it
is sufficient to show that there always exists a profile α1 which implies a probability
to sell J(p, α) ∈ (Jh, J l) and α1 ∈ MBRP (a0, σˆ) for some σˆ. If we show that, for
any j ∈ [0, 1], there always exists a profile α1 ∈ MBRP (a0, σˆ) that gives J(p, α) = j,
then we have proved the result. Take any profile α1 such that the buyers’ individual
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probabilities to play p are given by α1(p) = {0, 0, ..., j, ..., 0}. Then J(p, α) = j holds.
All that remains to show is that there is always σˆ such that α1 ∈ MBRP (a0, σˆ).
Let b be the buyer who plays p with probability j when all other buyers play p with
probability zero. The payoff of buyer b when playing a1b = p and beliefs are given by
σˆ(h|p) is:
pib(p) ≡ σˆ(h|p)[u(h)− p] + (1− σˆ(h|p))[u(l)− p]. (60)
The payoff when playing a1b = p
∗ ∈ p is:
pib(p
∗) ≡ K∗(p∗){σ∗(h|p∗)[u(h)− p∗] + (1− σ∗(h|p∗))[u(l)− p∗]}, (61)
where, as usual, we rely on point iii of definition 1 and on the fact that the market is
large and therefore K∗(p∗) does not change after the deviation of one seller/buyer. If
playing p with probability j > 0 is a best response for b, then (60) must be equal to
(61). Thus, solving for σˆ:
σˆ(h|p) = K∗(p∗)σ∗(h|p∗) + p−K
∗(p∗)p∗ − (1−K∗(p∗))u(l)
u(h)− u(l) . (62)
Note that non-emptiness or R2 implies that σˆ(h|p) ≤ 1. Also, playing p with proba-
bility zero must be optimal for all buyers different from b. Note that if buyer b plays
p with probability j > 0, the probability to obtain the good at p for all other buyers
is K(p) = 1− j
2
< 1. Thus, equation (60) becomes:
pir(p) = K(p){σˆ(h|p)[u(h)− p] + (1− σˆ(h|p))[u(l)− p]}, r ∈ B, r 6= b. (63)
Substituting σˆ from equation (62) gives:
pir(p) = K(p)pir(p
∗) < pir(p∗) ∀r ∈ B, r 6= b. (64)
Therefore, when buyer b plays p with probability j and beliefs are given by σˆ, playing
p with probability zero is a best response for all other buyers. 
Proof of lemma 4
Case a. Consider first the case in which θ > (1−λ). Note that if this inequality holds
both types make zero profits, thus condition (17) becomes 0 = 0 and high quality
sellers are never more likely to deviate than low quality. Thus, the equilibrium is
robust to divinity.
Case b. Consider type I FSE where θ ≤ (1− λ) so that low quality sellers are the
short side of the market. In equilibrium, high quality sellers make zero profits, pi∗s(h) =
0, while low quality sellers make profits pi∗s(l) = u(l)− v(l). Thus, for J(p, α) > 0 and
p > v(h), condition (17) becomes:
u(l)− v(l)
p− v(l) > 0, (65)
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which implies that, for any p > v(h), high quality sellers need a lower probability Jh
to be willing to deviate than low quality sellers. Also, buyers make zero surplus, such
that the condition (16) becomes
λ(u(h)− p) + (1− λ)(u(l)− p) > 0 (66)
for some p. Since p must be greater than v(h), the necessary and sufficient condition
is
λ(u(h)− v(h)) + (1− λ)(u(l)− v(h)) > 0, (67)
which implies that the equilibrium fails divinity if λ > λˆ, where λˆ is the same as in
lemma (2). 
Proof of lemma 5
Case a. It is immediate to show that type I equilibria satisfy D1 when 1 − λ > θ.
Inspection of condition (18) yields 0 ≥ 0 that is always true for any p. Therefore, for
any p, Jh = J l. Such equilibria are always robust to D1.
Case b. Type I equilibria where 1− λ ≤ θ always fail D1. In equilibrium, low quality
sellers make profits pi∗(l) = u(l) − v(l) while high quality sellers make zero profits.
Condition (18) becomes, for any p > v(h):
u(l)− v(l)
p− v(l) ≤ 0, (68)
which is not met by any p > v(h) > v(l), which implies J l > Jh. Also, condition (19)
becomes u(h)− p > 0 which implies that any deviation p ∈ (v(h), u(h)) would destroy
the equilibrium. 
Proof of lemma 6
To begin with, we note that p∗ must be always strictly lower than u(h), otherwise
buyers would make a loss. Condition (20) is never verified for p > p∗. So, for deviations
above the pooling equilibrium price, high quality sellers are more likely to deviate. As
for condition (22), buyers prefer to buy at p as long as p is lower than p∗ + η, η ≡
(1−λ)K∗(p∗)[u(h)−u(l)]+(1−K∗(p∗))u(h) > 0. Thus, any deviation p ∈ (p∗, p∗+η)
would cause the equilibrium to unravel.
The same argument also kills all the hybrid equilibria. To see this, note that if
the same type trades at different prices in equilibrium, all such prices should ensure
the same expected payoff to the same type. Then, we can pick the payoff at a given
price to represent the type’s equilibrium payoff. Also, in any hybrid equilibrium, there
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is at least one price, p∗, at which both qualities are trading. Hence, we just need to
compare the payoffs at that price. Let σ∗(h|p∗) be the probability to sample a high
type at p∗. Condition (22) becomes:
u(h)− p > K∗(p∗){σ∗(h|p∗)[u(h)− p∗] + (1− σ∗(h|p∗))[u(l)− p∗]}, (69)
where σ∗(h|p∗) is strictly lower than 1 by assumption. But then, any p ∈ (p∗, p∗ + η˜),
η˜ ≡ (1−σ∗(h|p∗))K∗(p∗)[u(h)−u(l)]+(1−K∗(p∗))u(h) > 0 would cause the equilibrium
to unravel. 
Proof of lemma 8
Consider the incentive compatibility condition for buyers and low quality sellers (not-
ing that the ICC for high quality sellers is never binding):
[pl − v(l)] ≥ [ph − v(l)]J∗(ph) (70)
[u(l)− pl]K∗(pl) = [u(h)− ph]K∗(ph), (71)
where we set K∗(ph) = 1 whenever ph < u(h). We first show that if buyers make
positive surplus, then J∗(ph) > 0. Then, we prove that if ph > v(h) the ICC of low
quality sellers holds with equality. Finally, using that result, we prove J∗(ph) > 0 for
the case in which buyers do not make any surplus at neither prices, i.e. pl = u(l) and
ph = u(h) (buyers’ ICC implies that they should experience the same expected surplus
at both prices). When prices are below the buyers’ reservation prices, no buyer ever





On the other hand, if pl < u(l), K
∗(pl) must be 1. If K∗(pl) were less than 1, low
quality sellers would increase their profits by announcing a price p = pl + ,  > 0
slightly higher than pl. This deviation would induce a buyer to buy, unless pl = u(l)




We now show that, whenever ph > v(h), condition (32) implies that ICCl holds
with equality. Rewrite ICCl as:
[pl − v(l)] = [ph − v(l)]J∗(ph) + η (73)
for η ≥ 0. Now substituting pl − v(l) in (32) yields
ph ≤ ph[v(h)− v(l)] + v(h)η
v(h)− v(l) + η , (74)
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which can be rewritten as




v(h)− v(l) + η . (75)
So, for ph > v(h), η must be zero.
We now turn to the case in which pl = u(l) and ph = u(h). Then, given that high
quality sellers announce ph = u(h) > v(h) and given that low quality sellers’ profits
are u(l)− v(l) > 0, J∗(ph) > 0 must be satisfied for the ICCl to hold with equality.
To conclude, we note that probabilities to buy and sell at equilibrium prices take
only one possible ex-post realisation. Sellers always play pure strategies in equilibrium.
Hence, the stochastic nature of the probabilities to buy and sell only depends on the
number of buyers who buy at each of the equilibrium prices. Let X be the number
of buyers who buy at pl ex-post, and B − X the number of buyers who buy at ph.





. We know that the
ex-ante expected value, J∗(pl), must equal 1. Hence, only realizationsX ≥ (1−λ)S can







. Again, the ex-ante expected value K∗(pl) must be one. But then,
only realizations X ≤ (1−λ)S can take positive probability in equilibrium. Thus, the
only possible realization of X is X = (1− λ)S. This implies that probabilities to buy
and sell take a single value with certainty. Thus, either buyers play pure strategies, or
they play mixed strategy but, in this case, the outcome of their joint randomization
must converge to a certain value. In other words, there is no aggregate uncertainty.

Proof of lemma 9
Whenever ph > v(h), the ICC of type l holds with equality from lemma 8. But then,
from buyers’ ICC, pl and ph must satisfy
ph =
u(h)−K∗(pl)[u(l)− v(l) + v(l)J∗(ph)]
1−K∗(pl)J∗(ph) (76)
pl =
v(l) + J∗(ph)[u(h)− v(l)− u(l)K∗(ph)]
1−K∗(pl)J∗(ph) . (77)
We now verify when K∗(pl) and J∗(ph) are such that ph and pl satisfy the participation
constraints: v(l) ≤ pl ≤ u(l), and v(h) ≤ ph ≤ u(h). pl ≤ u(l) implies:
v(l) + J∗(ph)[u(h)− v(l)− u(l)K∗(pl)] ≤ [1−K∗(pl)J∗(ph)]u(l)⇒ J∗(pl) ≤ δ, (78)
pl ≥ v(l) implies:




Again ph ≤ u(h) gives:
K∗(pl)[u(l)− v(l) + v(l)J∗(ph)] ≤ −K∗(pl)J∗(ph)u(h)⇒ J∗(pl) ≤ δ. (80)
Finally, ph ≥ v(h) yields:
u(h)−K∗(pl)[u(l)− v(l) + v(l)J∗(ph)] ≤ [1−K∗(pl)J∗(ph)]v(h), (81)
or:
u(h)− v(h) +K∗(pl)[J∗(ph)(v(h)− v(l))− (u(l)− v(l))] ≥ 0. (82)
Since J∗(ph) ≤ δ implies J∗(ph)(v(h)− v(l))− (u(l)− v(l)) < 0, the above expression
becomes
K∗(pl) ≤ u(h)− v(h)
u(l)− v(l)− J∗(ph)(v(h)− v(l)) . (83)
Since δ < 1, the condition K∗(pl) ≤ 1δ is always trivially satisfied for any K∗(pl).
The condition J∗(ph) ≤ δ gives an upper bound for the probability to sell at the
high price. Consider condition (83). As in the proof of lemma 8, we note that either
K∗(pl) = 1 or pl = u(l) (which, from the buyers’ ICC, implies ph = u(h)). If K∗(pl)
were less than 1, low quality sellers would increase their profits by announcing a price
p = pl+ ,  > 0 slightly higher than pl. Unless pl = u(l), this deviation would induce
a buyer to buy since he would obtain the good with probability 1 at p.
When pl = u(l) and ph = u(h), the participation constraint ph ≥ v(h) is trivially
satisfied. If ph < u(h), substituting K
∗(pl) = 1 in (83) gives J∗(ph) ≥ γ. If this
condition did not hold, the price announced by the type h would not satisfy his par-
ticipation constraint. In this case, the only possible equilibrium is that he announces
ph = v(h), so that the ICC of type l does not need to hold with equality. We thus
distinguish between the case in which γ ≤ 0 and the case γ > 0.
Case 1: γ ≤ 0. In this case, J∗(ph) ≥ γ always holds. Then, equilibrium prices are
either pl = u(l) and ph = u(h), which imply J
∗(ph) = δ, or
ph = v(l) +
u(h)− u(l)
1− J∗(ph) (84)
pl = v(l) +
J∗(ph)[u(h)− u(l)]
1− J∗(ph) . (85)
Since these prices leave positive surplus to the buyers, the equilibrium requires that







which, for K∗(pl) = 1, gives J∗(ph) =
θ−(1−λ)
λ
≥ 0. Substituting the value of J∗(ph)
into (84) and (85) gives the equilibrium prices.
Thus, the high quality is always traded unless θ = 1−λ. Note now that J∗(ph) < δ
implies θ < 1 − λ + λδ. Hence, we can have prices that leave positive surplus to the
buyers only if the ratio of buyers to sellers, θ, is below the threshold 1−λ+λδ. What
remains to show is that if θ < 1 − λ + λδ, then pq = u(q), q = h, l, never holds. In
other words, K∗(pl) must be 1. ph = u(h) always requires J∗(ph) = δ. Note that the
maximum value that J∗(ph) can take in any case is
θ−(1−λ)
λ
which is the value that it
takes if K∗(pl) = 1 and all buyers are on the market (which is not necessarily true if
pq = u(q), q = h, l). But then, given θ < 1− λ+ λδ, J∗(pl) < δ follows.
Case 2: γ > 0. If θ−(1−λ)
λ
> γ, then the condition J∗(ph) ≥ γ holds and the above
discussion applies. Prices are given by equations (84) and (85) for θ < 1− λ+ λδ and
by pq = u(q) for θ ≥ 1− λ+ λδ. If, by converse, θ−(1−λ)λ ≤ γ, type h would announce
v(h). From buyers’ ICC, the price announced by type l is:
pl = u(l)−K∗(pl)[u(h)− v(h)] < u(l). (87)




Note that γ > 0 is necessary for the type h to announce v(h). On the other hand,
γ > 0 always ensures that equation (87) does not violate pl ≥ v(l).
Finally, note that since prices ph and pl and probabilities J
∗(ph) and K∗(pl) only
depend on parameters, the equilibrium outcome is unique. 
Proof of lemma 10
The result can be easily proved by analysing the behaviour of the equilibrium outcome
as θ changes. From lemma 9, if θ ≥ 1 − λ, then the equilibrium outcome is unique.
When θ < 1−λ, the high quality is not traded from lemma 8. In this case we can have
either equilibria of type I where high quality sellers are out of the market or equilibria
of type II in which high quality sellers announce a price at which no trade takes place.
In both cases, price competition requires that low quality sellers make zero profits, so
that trade only occurs at p∗ = v(l) and the quantity traded is always θS. 
Proof of lemma 11
Consider a deviation p ∈ (v(q), pq). Note that buyers are willing to buy at p if they
think that the deviation comes from type q, since p < pq. We argue that whenever it
is possible to delete type q− 1 from the deviation it is also possible to delete all types
q − s, s ≥ 2. To show this point, assume that type q − 1 can be eliminated:
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
p− v(q − 1) >
J(pq)[pq − v(q)]
p− v(q) . (88)
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Consider now type q − s. From the incentive compatibility condition:
J(pq−s)[pq−s − v(q − s)]
p− v(q − s) ≥
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − s)]
p− v(q − s) . (89)
But then, for any p > v(q) > pq−1, the following relationship
J(pq−s)[pq−s − v(q − s)]
p− v(q − s) >
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
p− v(q − 1) (90)
holds, which implies that type q−s can be deleted, whenever type q−1 can be deleted.
Since p < pq < u(q) < v(q+1), sellers of type higher than q are never willing to deviate
to p. This implies that if type q−1 can be deleted, beliefs should be that the deviation
comes from q. As in the two-quality case, we show that whenever pq > v(q), a viable
deviation p ∈ (v(q), pq), for which type q − 1 can be eliminated, exists as long as the
incentive compatibility condition of type q − 1 holds with inequality. Suppose then
the ICC holds with strict inequality. Assume that the deviation consists in a price
p = pq − ,  > 0 which is a small undercutting of price pq. We want to show that
there exists  > 0 such that:
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
pq − − v(q − 1) >
J(pq)[pq − v(q)]
pq − − v(q) . (91)
Condition (91) can be rewritten as:
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
J(pq)[pq − v(q − 1)] >
pq − v(q)
pq − v(q − 1)
pq − − v(q − 1)
pq − − v(q) . (92)
For pq > v(q), the LHS (which does not depend on ) is strictly greater than 1 whenever
the ICC of type q−1 holds with strict inequality. On the other hand, the RHS goes to
1 as  becomes small. Thus, there always exists  such that type q − 1 can be deleted
unless either the ICC holds with equality or pq = v(q). In fact, in the case pq = v(q),
undercutting is never profitable for type q. Hence, either the ICC holds with equality
or pq = v(q).
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